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Abstract
The voluntary tithe, as a moral obligation designed to encourage
successful people to contribute to charitable causes, has ancient roots in
the Judeo-Christian tradition.
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At the end of every three years you shall bring forth all the
tithe of your produce in the same year, and lay it up within your
towns; and the . . . sojourner, the fatherless and the widow, who
are within your towns, shall come and eat and be filled; that the
Lord your God may bless you in all the work of your hands that
you do.1
I. Introduction
The voluntary tithe, as a moral obligation designed to encourage
successful people to contribute to charitable causes, has ancient roots in
the Judeo-Christian tradition. In recent years, the idea of a mandatory
tithe for land developers has appeared in the form of local regulations
that condition the approval of certain types of land development on the
developer's agreement to contribute to certain other types of develop-
ment that further particular public purposes. For example, someone
who wants to build a downtown office building is allowed to do so only
by also contributing to the construction of new housing. These pro-
grams are often described as "linkage" programs.
This article will review the legal issues posed by linkage programs.
To do so it will first look at the historical trends out of which linkage
programs evolved. The article describes in more detail the linkage pro-
grams in a few communities and compares these programs to related
regulatory schemes such as inclusionary zoning, incentive zoning and
transfer of development rights. The article then examines federal con-
* B.A., University of Colorado; J.D., Harvard University. Partner - Burke, Bos-
selman & Weaver, Chicago, Illinois.
** B.A., Indiana University; M.R.P., J.D., University of North Carolina. Part-
ner - Burke, Bosselman & Weaver, Boca Raton, Florida.
This article is prepared as a part of a more extensive study of development exac-
tions, sponsored by the Homer Hoyt Institute at Florida State University.
1. Deuteronomy 14: 28-29 (Rev. Standard ed.).
1
Bosselman and Stroud: Mandatory Tithes: The Legality of Land Development Linkage
Published by NSUWorks, 1985
Nova Law Journal
stitutional issues raised by linkage programs in light of evolving Su-
preme Court doctrine. Finally, the article reviews the ways in which
the courts of different states are likely to approach linkage.
In view of the concern expressed by most developers toward
linkage programs, it is ironic that these programs have evolved out of
two trends in land use regulation that have been strongly supported by
the development industry: (1) the replacement of pre-set zoning regula-
tions with flexible impact analysis techniques, and (2) the search for
ways to avoid the exclusionary effect of traditional zoning policies.
II. The PUD Movement
In the 1950's and 1960's one of the most common complaints of
the development industry was that traditional zoning regulations were
too rigid. The regulations were designed to replicate the development
patterns of the 1920's, the era when zoning was born and when the
previous boom in land development took place. These regulations as-
sumed that most residential development would take the form of single
family houses on individual lots. Office buildings and retail stores
would be located in the central business district radiating out from the
"prime" corner. Apartments, which were sometimes thought of as a
commercial rather than a residential use, were limited to the fringes of
the central business district.2
The development industry quickly saw that the postwar auto-ori-
ented society was seeking a different product. Inflated land costs were
pricing the detached house out of the reach of most potential buyers
and creating a demand for clustered housing. The new outlying shop-
ping centers were only the first evidence of a demand for a wide range
of commercial, office and light industrial development in areas far from
traditional urban cores.3 Zoning was not designed to encourage the
type of development the market then demanded. Minimum lot size and
yard requirements made housing expensive.4 Standard commercial bulk
2. See Babcock & Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom, 111
U. PA. L. REV. 1040, 1060-61 (1963).
3. See TASK FORCE ON LAND USE AND URBAN GROWTH, THE USE OF LAND: A
CITIZENS' POLICY GUIDE To GROWTH 82-88 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Task Force];
G. FUQUITT, P. Voss & J. DOHERTY, GROWTH AND CHANGE IN RURAL AMERICA 9-12
(1979); ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, URBAN AND
RURAL AMERICA: POLICIES FOR FUTURE GROWTH (1968) [hereinafter cited as ADVI-
SORY COMMISSION].
4. W. WHYTE, THE LAST LANSCAPE 201-02 (1968).
[Vol. 9
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and layout rules gave little guidance for developments that were not
tied to existing commercial districts, and rigid use-separation rules
often prevented the type of mixed-use development that made the most
sense.
5
The development industry's response was to promote the planned
unit development, or PUD, concept.6 Its proponents argued that once
developments achieved a certain size (often five acres) the interrela-
tionship of the various parts of the development became of equal if not
greater importance than the relationship to surrounding uses. Because
the entire development was being planned as a whole it was possible to
control the development through the approval of a master development
plan. The availability of this control opportunity meant that traditional
yard, lot, bulk and even use regulations could be abandoned, or at least
relaxed, in favor of the more flexible evaluation of the proposed master
plan in accordance with more general planning principles.7
As acceptance of the PUD concept grew, developments in rapidly
growing areas increasingly took advantage of this technique.8 In some
instances the PUD concept swallowed up the zoning ordinance that
gave it birth and regurgitated it in the form of standards for evaluating
the impact of proposed PUDs. These standards carried names such as
impact zoning or performance zoning and were designed to replace
traditional zoning regulations. 9
The key policy of the PUD concept was that each development of
substantial size deserved to be evaluated on its own merits. The popu-
larity of environmental and fiscal impact analysis during the 1970's led
to the evaluation of new development not only on the basis of tradi-
tional zoning concerns, such as the impact on immediate neighbors, but
on broader environmental policies and on the fiscal health of the com-
munity. Such regulatory techniques that use impact analysis as a major
5. 2 N. WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW 229-34 (1974).
6. See generally Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development: A Challenge To Es-
tablished Theory and Practice of Land Use Control, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 4 (1965); D.
MANDELKER, CONTROLLING PLANNED RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS (American Soci-
ety of Planning Officials Series 1967); FRONTIERS OF PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT:
A SYNTHESIS OF EXPERT OPINION (R. Burchell ed. 1973).
7. Vladeck, Large Scale Developments and One House Zoning Controls, 20
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 255 (1955).
8. See R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, LAND USE CONTROLS 265-269 (1981).
9. See, e.g., KENDIG, CONNER, BYRD & HEYMAN, PERFORMANCE ZONING
(1980); Yannocone, Jr., Rahenkamp & Cerchione, Impact Zoning: Altenative to Ex-
clusion in the Suburbs, 8 URB. LAW. 417 (1976).
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component effectively delay the land use controls until the developer's
intentions are known.10
This new "wait-and-see" type of regulation required a major
change in the theory of land use regulation. As originally conceived,
land use regulation was to be based on a map dividing the jurisdiction
into zoning districts. An ordinance would set forth the criteria under
which development could take place in each district. A developer would
only need to read the map and ordinance to determine the rules appli-
cable to any particular tract of land."' The proponents of this system of
regulation justified it because the preparation of a map based on an
overall plan of the entire community would provide a reciprocity of
benefits to all property owners.12 Even though use of a particular tract
was restricted, the owner obtained the benefits of living in a more or-
derly and efficient community.13
The importance of an overall plan was such a significant element
in defense of zoning regulations that the proponents of zoning vigor-
ously opposed any efforts to encourage significant change in the plan
through administrative variance. 4 Amendments to the map were per-
mitted, but only under rules designed to discourage changes in small
parcels. 15 And regulations devised in response to specific development
proposals were prohibited under the label of "contract zoning."1
In practice, however, the creation of an "end-state plan" setting
forth the future use of land proved extremely difficult. 17 Rapid changes
in economic and social conditions forced planners to reevaluate plans
regularly or see them become obsolete. It became popular to say that
planning should be a process of controlling change rather than a map.,,
10. Task Force, supra note 3, at 189.
11. E. BASSETT, ZONING: THE LAWS, ADMINISTRATION, AND COURT DECISIONS
DURING THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 50 (2d ed. 1940).
12. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)("[A]n average reci-
procity of advantage ... has been recognized as a justification for various laws"). See
Lefcoe, California's Land Planning Requirements: The Case for Deregulation, 54 S.
CAL. L. REV. 447, 457-58 (1981).
13. D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 21-22 (1982). See S. TOLL, ZONED AMERI-
CAN 124-26 (1969); R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 116-20 (1966).
14. See E. BASSETT, supra note 11, at 121.
15. 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 5.17 (2d ed. 1976).
16. See E. BASSETT, supra note 11, at 184.
17. See MODEL LAND DEV. CODE art. 3 commentary (Official Draft 1975).
18. 1 N. WILLIAMS, JR., supra note 5, at at 26-27. See Rose, Planning and Deal-
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Moreover, many elected local government officials learned that the
map was a handicap. If all the rules were pre-established by the map
and accompanying regulations, the developer would not need the ap-
proval of the local legislative body before undertaking a project. And if
the project proved unpopular with the public the elected official would
take the heat without having been able to stop the project. 9
This handicap could be avoided, however, by preparing a map
classifying most undeveloped land into some relatively restricted cate-
gory, forcing each developer to seek an amendment from the legislative
body. When the National Commission on Urban Problems studied the
subject in the late 1960's, they discovered a dramatic shift toward this
type of wait-and-see zoning.20
Because wait-and-see zoning was hard to square with the overall
plan theory on which zoning was originally based,21 new techniques
such as planned unit development were devised to legitimize the pro-
cess.22 But many communities continued to rely on the process of re-
zoning in response to each major development, knowing that potential
challenges to the legitimacy of the process would be difficult and time-
23consuming.
Bargaining between developer and local government became the
way the regulatory process worked. It evolved in that way because both
sides get some benefits out of a bargaining process. The developer bene-
fits by being able to buy land that is not predesignated for intensive
development and thus does not command as high a price as it otherwise
would. The elected official benefits by retaining legislative discretion to
discourage development disliked by the voters and to obtain contribu-
tions from developers toward the construction of public facilities. The
process of bargaining over the impact of each development proposal has
become so common that some respected commentators have suggested
that zoning be abolished and replaced with a more tightly regulated
bargaining process.24
As bargaining became a way of life, however, the predictability of
land use regulation obviously declined. From the perspective of the lo-
19. See R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 8, at 59.
20. ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 206-07.
21. Id. at 223-24.
22. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
23. C. PETERSON & C. MCCARTHY, HANDLING ZONING AND LAND USE LITIGA-
TION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 234-45 (1982).
24. See Krasnowiecki, Abolish Zoning, 31 SYRACUSE L. REv. 719 (1980).
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cal government, wait-and-see regulation would work only if the govern-
ment retained legislative discretion to approve or deny the developer's
request. Such discretion would give the government the flexibility to
ask for an unlimited range of design changes, contributions or other
"sweeteners" from the developer without being bound by any set of
prearranged rules. The local governing body would merely need to sug-
gest that the absence of such sweeteners would mean disapproval of the
development proposal. The developer was left with the unenviable
choice of complying or challenging on the basis of an abuse of legisla-
tive discretion. 5
While some communities dealt with developers on a purely ad hoc
basis, others took the initiative to define in advance the types of sweet-
eners they were looking for by names such as "incentive zoning." In-
centive zoning is the term usually used to define those regulations that
permit a developer to exceed the bulk or density standards otherwise
controlling if the development is designed to include some specific fea-
ture that promotes a particular government policy.2"
The desired feature that started the incentive zoning trend was the
downtown plaza. Seeing a need for more open spaces in the "canyons"
of Manhattan, New York City's planners allowed the developers of
Lever House to exceed the height limitations in exchange for the instal-
lation of a plaza at street level.17 A decade later windswept plazas at
the base of Miesian slabs became the norm.2 8 Dazzled by their success,
New York City's planners began giving similar incentives or bonuses to
developers who put shopping arcades, theaters, and a wide range of
other uses in their buildings.29
An outgrowth of incentive zoning is transfer of development rights
(TDR), a term used to describe a wide variety of programs. The more
25. Task Force, supra note 3, at 189-91. See J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY,
ZONING ATTACKS AND DEFENSES: THE LAW IN FLORIDA 31-33 (1980).
26. Mandelker, The Basic Philosophy of Zoning: Incentive or Restraint, in THE
NEW ZONING: LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE AND ECONOMIC CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES
14 (N. Marcus & M. Groves eds. 1970).
27. Elliott & Marcus, New Directions In Land Development Controls, 1 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 56 (1973).
28. See A. SPIRN, THE GRANITE GARDEN: URBAN NATURE AND HUMAN DESIGN
77-79, 247 (1984); C. WEAVER & R. BABCOCK, CITY ZONING: THE ONCE AND FUTURE
FRONTIER 61-62 (1979).
29. Weaver & Babcock, supra note 28, at 300-02. See Weinstein, How New
York's Zoning Has Changed To Induce the Construction of Legitimate Theaters in
THE NEW ZONING, supra note 26, at 131.
[Vol. 9
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sweeping TDR systems demand that developers seeking to build more
than certain specified quantaities of development in a particular "trans-
fer" area must buy up the equivalent rights to develop property from a
"preservation" area that the government is trying to protect from de-
velopment. 30 These TDR programs seek to make the development in-
dustry bear the cost of preserving landmarks or agricultural land by
apportioning a relatively small share of those preservation costs to each
developer who seeks to build at the density levels designed for the
transfer areas.31
In many communities, the bargaining process is much more free-
wheeling than in these more structured systems, and the actual power
wielded by the local government is much greater than the case law
might lead one to believe.32 This has led to a number of proposals for
change in the system to reduce the extent of legislative discretion in
reviewing individual development proposals. 3 The desire for change
was stimulated in a large part by the exclusionary nature of many of
these regulations.
III. Exclusionary Zoning
The highly discretionary land use controls encouraged by the PUD
movement helped those who sought to keep minorities out of rapidly
growing areas by making it extremely difficult to challenge the exclu-
30. D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE
CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION 533-51 (1978); Costonis, Development Rights Transfer:
An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973); Carmichael, Transferable Develop-
ment Rights As a Basis for Land Use Control, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 35 (1974);
Bozung, Transfer Development Rights: Compensation For Owners Of Restricted Prop-
erty, 6 ZONING & PLANNING L. REP. 129 (1983).
3 1. For a more critical evaluation of the TDR concept see Note, The Unconstitu-
tionality of Transferable Development Rights, 84 YALE L.J. 1001, 1113-21 (1975);
Gale, The Transfer of Development Rights: Some Equity Considerations, 14 URE. L.
ANN. 81, 88, 96 (1977); R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 8, at 701. Professor
Norman Williams suggests that such programs "clearly open up increased opportuni-
ties for either (a) carrying out a rational program on the allocation of density, or (b)
graft and corruption on really large scale." WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 376.
32. See R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 8, at 234-80.
33. See, e.g., Fasano v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Washington County, 264 Or. 574, 507
P.2d 23 (1973); COUNCIL FOR DEVELOPMENT CHOICES IN THE '80s, THE AFFORDABLE
COMMUNITY: GROWTH, CHANGE AND CHOICE IN THE '80s 88-90 (1981); HOUSING
FOR ALL UNDER LAW 408-10 (R. Fishman ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as HOUSING
FOR ALL]; J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, supra note 25, at 77-79; MODEL LAND
DEV. CODE §2-201-§2-212 (Proposed Official Draft 1975).
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sionary aspect of the regulations. The standing hurdles, the problems of
proof and the high cost of such cases has meant that exclusionary zon-
ing can be proven only in cases where the violations were repeated and
blatant, 4 despite the fact that the Supreme Court interpreted the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 to permit actions against communities that em-
ployed a pattern of zoning practices designed to exclude minorities.3 5
As the issue of exclusionary zoning became a subject of general
public discussion, some of the more rapidly growing local governments
concluded that their exclusionary zoning policies were having an ad-
verse effect on their own communities. When they discovered that they
could not hire policemen, firemen and school teachers from within their
own boundaries, some of the larger jurisdictions began to ask develop-
ers to reserve a specific, small fraction of new units in each develop-
ment for federally subsidized housing. Such a policy became known as
"inclusionary zoning."
The policy basis for this approach grew out of the "critical mass"
and "tipping point" theories that had been propounded by observers of
racial and ethnic population movements. A modest number of minority
group members could be integrated into a neighborhood without having
substantial adverse effect, but if the numbers reached a "tipping point"
the original residents would flee. When this theory was applied to hous-
ing there was an assumption that so long as the great majority of the
housing stock could be maintained at a price and quality level sufficient
to form a "critical mass" the introduction of a small percentage of sub-
sidized housing for lower income groups would not cause a substantial
decline in neighborhood property value.36
34. Warth v. Sedlin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Hope, Inc. v. County of Du Page, 738
F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc); United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049
(N.D. Ohio 1980), modified, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926
(1982). Compare HOUSING FOR ALL, supra note 33, at 126-31, with Silverman, Hous-
ingfor All Under Law: The Limits of Legalist Reform, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 99, 114-
20 (1979). See also Lamb & Lustig, The Burger Court, Exclusionary Zoning, and the
Activist-Restraint Debate, 4 U. PITT. L. REV. 169 (1978); Mandelker, Racial Discrimi-
nation and Exclusionary Zoning: A Perspective on Arlington Heights, 55 TEx. L. REV.
1217 (1977). See generally D. MOSKOWITZ, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING LITIGATION
(1977).
35. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977).
36. See Kleven, Inclusionary Ordinances-Policy and Legal Issues in Requiring
Private Developers to Build Low Cost Housing, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1432 (1974). A
recent summary of local inclusionary ordinances is found in A. MALLACH, INCLUSION-
ARY HOUSING PROGRAMS: POLICIES AND PRACTICES 196-264 (1984).
[Vol. 9
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Inclusionary zoning ordinances were adopted by a number of the
larger local governments where substantial growth was taking place
during the early 1970's. These ordinances required (or in some case,
offered incentives for) the inclusion of a percentage of subsidized low
income housing in each housing development. Among the communities
adopting this type of ordinance were a number of the jurisdictions sur-
rounding Washington, D.C. and a number the large and growing
southern California communities. 37 Inclusionary zoning received a set-
back in 1973 when the Virginia Supreme Court found the Fairfax
County ordinance to be invalid under the Virginia Constitution.38 Be-
cause of the Virginia Supreme Court's long history of antipathy to lo-
cal government regulation,39 the decision wasn't treated very seriously
in states like California where the state courts were at the opposite end
of the spectrum.40 But in more conservative states, the Virginia decision
was viewed as a roadblock to experimentation with inclusionary
zoning.41
The withdrawal of federal housing subsidies under the Reagan ad-
ministration eliminated any pretense that inclusionary zoning could be
accomplished in a cost-free manner.42 In the absence of subsidies, in-
clusionary zoning would subject developers to a major financial bur-
den.43 Searching for a more satisfactory approach, local governments
have begun the transformation of inclusionary zoning from a regulatory
tool imposed on the residential development industry to an exaction im-
posed on non-residential development.
37. Kleven, supra note 36, at 1439-46.
38. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfax Co. v. DeGroff Enter., 214 Va. 235, 198 S.E.2d
600 (1973).
39. Richards, Zoning for Direct Social Control, 1982 DUKE L.J. 761, 831.
40. Hagman, Taking Care of One's Own through Inclusionary Zoning: Boot-
strapping Low- and Moderate-Income Housing by Local Government 5 URB. L. &
PoL. 169 (1982).
41. See, e.g., Note, Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enterprises, Inc.: A Case of
Inclusionary Zoning, 60 IOWA L. REV. 413, 418 (1974); H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK & A.
LEVIN, INZONING: A GUIDE FOR POLICY-MAKERS ON INCLUSIONARY LAND USE PRO-
GRAMS 33, 139 (1974); R. BURCHELL, MT. LAUREL II: CHALLENGE AND DELIVERY OF
Low COST HOUSING 351 (1984); J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, supra note 25, at
148-53 (1980).
42. See Baade, Required Low-Income Housing in Residential Developments:
Constitutional Challenges to a Community Imposed Quota, 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 439,
445, 460 (1974).
43. See A. MALLACH, supra note 36, at 86-103; Muth, Redistribution of Income
Through Regulation in Housing, 32 EMORY L.J. 691, 707-10 (1983).
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IV. Linkage Programs
Job-generating facilities, such as office parks or industrial develop-
ment, can more easily be shown to create a need for low-income hous-
ing than residential development does. If an exaction is to be imposed,
should not commercial and industrial development pay rather than resi-
dential development? 44 Should communities be allowed to encourage
development that would create jobs but forbid the housing needed by
the workers?
In 1980 the City of San Francisco began implementing a linkage
program to encourage office developers to build housing.45 Specifically,
under the Office Housing Production Program developers of office
buildings containing more than 50,000 square feet are required to build
or finance the amount of new housing in the City that will be needed to
house the office workers generated by the development. The require-
ment is based on the following assumptions: office use generates one
employee per two hundred and fifty square feet; forty percent of all
office employees in San Francisco reside in San Francisco; and 1.8
working adults occupy each residential unit. This generates a require-
ment of approximately nine new dwelling units per 10,000 square feet
of office space.46
The new housing can be for people of any income level, but the
developers are given incentives to produce modestly priced housing by
allowing them to provide fewer units if the units are for moderate in-
come people. There are no restrictions on the location in San Francisco
in which the housing must be built. As alternative to building housing,
the developer may contribute to a municipal housing trust - known as
the Shared Appreciation Mortgage Pool. The amount of contribution is
6,000 dollars for each housing unit required. The trust funds are used
to reduce mortgage payments of low and middle income house buy-
ers.417 As of April 1984, the City of San Francisco states that its pro-
44. See Ellickson, The Irony of Exclusionary Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167
(1981).
45. A. MALLACH, supra note 36, at 180-85; Tegeler, Developer Payments and
Downtown Housing Trust Funds, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 679, 682-83 (1984); Dia-
mond, The San Francisco Offce-Housing Program: Social Policy Underwritten by Pri-
vate Enterprise, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 449 (1983).
46. D. MARINO, STRATEGIES FOR LINKED DEVELOPMENT: AN EXAMINATION OF
APPROACHES IN OTHER CITIES 3 (Chicago Dept. of Planning Report, Dec. 6, 1984);
Diamond, supra note 45, at 428.
47. For example, (a) two housing credits per affordable unit for moderate-in-
[Vol. 9
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gram has generated almost 3000 units of housing, a majority of which
were for low and moderate income families. In addition, the trust fund
has accrued approximately five million dollars.48 Despite its success,
critics have continued to argue that San Francisco's program ought to
be oriented exclusively toward moderately priced housing, and studies
are currently underway that may lead to revision of the program.4 9
Boston has now adopted a linkage program based on a somewhat
similar analysis. The Boston program applies to developers of office,
retail, hotel and institutional facilities and to developers of any use
which will reduce the amount of existing low and moderate income
housing. The threshold for application of the program is 100,000
square feet of floor area. Each such developer must pay a fee of forty-
two dollars per square foot of floor area at the time the certificate of
occupancy is issued, and must contract to pay a similar fee in each of
the subsequent eleven years.50 The fee is to be turned over to a neigh-
borhood housing trust to be used for the development of low and mod-
erate income housing. The fee amounts to five dollars per square foot
spread out over a twelve-year period in equal payments. 1 The first ma-
jor project to which the fee is being applied is a 326 million dollar
come households built using governmental financial assistance, provided the developer
contributes to the construction costs; (b) three housing credits per affordable unit for
moderate-income households provided without government operating subsidies; and (c)
four housing credits for low-income households provided without government operating
subsidies. A. MALLACH, supra note 36, at 181-83; Diamond, supra note 45, at 458-59.
48. D. MARINO, supra note 46, at 4; Sedway, Inclusionary Zoning Conference
Presentation on the San Francisco Office Housing Production Program (Oct. 4, 1983)
(unpublished manuscript available from the authors). The impact of office development
in downtown San Francisco has been a source of other litigation. See San Franciscans
for Reasonable Growth v. City and County of San Francisco, 151 Cal. App. 3d 61,
Cal. Rptr. 634 (1984). For a historical perspective see Svirsky, San Francisco: The
Downtown Development Bonus System in THE NEW ZONING, supra note 26 at 139.
49. D. MARINO, supra note 46, at 5. In December 1983, the city of Santa Bar-
bara adopted a housing mitigation policy with emphasis on low and moderate income
housing. See Burch, Bozung, Miller & Hill, Land Use Controversies: Public Use and
Private Beneficiaries, 16 URB. LAW. 713, 719-21 (1984).
50. Tegeler, supra note 45, at 684; D. CONNERS & E. WODLINER, DEVELOPMENT
EXACTIONS: ATTACK AND DEFENSE 375-79 (Land Use Regulation and Litigation
Course of Study Materials 1984); ADVISORY GROUP, LINKAGE BETWEEN DOWNTOWN
DEVELOPMENT AND NEIGHBORHOOD HOUSING, (Report to the Mayor of Boston, Oct.
1983).
51. Werth, Tapping Developers, PLANNING, Jan. 1984, at 21, 23. Because the
payments are spread out over such a long term no actual housing is expected to be built
until 1986. D. MARINO, supra note 46, at 7.
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International Place office complex built by the Chiofaro Company in
downtown Boston. 2
In both San Francisco and Boston there has been considerable
concern about the extent to which state law authorizes these cities to
undertake linkage programs. The contributions in San Francisco have
been negotiated by the planning commission as part of the site plan
review process; there do not appear to have been any cases testing the
validity of this exercise of the power.5 3 In Boston, the program was
established by an ordinance creating a development impact district, but
the advisory group recommended a number of state statutory changes
to assure that the program has proper authorization. An earlier inclu-
sionary program in a suburb of Boston was found to lack statutory
authorization. 4
V. Federal Law
Linkage programs and their close relatives all involve exactions
imposed on developers for the purpose of solving problems far broader
than any problems created by a particular development. As a vehicle
for examining the federal law issues arising out of linkage programs it
is appropriate to examine in detail a recent Ninth Circuit case arising
out of the City of Klamath Falls, Oregon.
The plaintiff asked Klamath Falls to rezone his land to permit the
construction of 214 garden apartments. Before the plaintiff could de-
velop the property, however, the city needed to vacate some paper
streets that had been dedicated to the city years ago. During negotia-
tions with the city over the plaintiff's request for a street vacation, the
city asked him to dedicate a strip of land for the widening of a city
52. According to an article in the New York Times, this project is expected to
contribute $8.5 million over the next twelve years to the housing trust for neighborhood
development. N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1984, at 16, col. 1.
53. See D. CONNERS & E. WODLINGER, supra note 50, at 377. The fact that the
program may be used to construct housing at any price level means that the city must
argue that the construction of any type of housing is a public purpose, even if the
housing is for wealthy people, because of a filter-down process. See Diamond, supra
note 45, at 470.
54. D. MARINO, supra note 46, at 8. See Middlesex of Boston St. Ry. Co. v. Bd.
of Alderman of Newton, 371 Mass. 849, 359 N.E.2d 489 (1976). For a discussion of
potential statutory authority in New York see Comment, Zoning New York City To
Provide Low and Moderate Income Housing: Can Commercial Developers Be Made
To Help?, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 491 (1984).
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street adjacent to his property. Located on this land was a geothermal
well from which plaintiff hoped to obtain steam to heat the apartments
he would be constructing. He offered to dedicate to the city an ease-
ment on the surface of the property which would allow the city to
widen the street, but he refused to convey to the city the rights to the
underground well. The city was attempting to set up a geothermal util-
ity district to provide heat and power to the public generally, and the
city refused to vacate the street unless plaintiff conveyed his geother-
mal well to the city.
The plaintiff brought a section 1983 action in the federal district
court, which ruled in favor of the city on motion for summary judg-
ment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, remanding the
case back for trial on all of the major issues. In the process, the court
interpreted the relevant law in a manner quite favorable to the plain-
tiff, finding that he had stated a valid complaint under the constitu-
tional clauses protecting against the taking of property without com-
pensation, against violations of due process of law, and against denial
of equal protection of the laws.55
The court treated the case as equivalent to a subdivison exactions
case in which a developer is being asked to contribute land or money in
exchange for needed governmental permission. Citing Supreme Court
decisions on "unconstitutional conditions," the court stated that the
government cannot condition a privilege on a requirement that the ap-
plicant give up constitutional rights. In this instance, said the court, the
plaintiff was being asked to give up his property rights in a geothermal
well in exchange for a street vacation. Such a condition would be ac-
ceptable only if there were some reasonably identifiable connection be-
tween the city's need for the geothermal well and the purpose underly-
ing the law requiring permits for street vacations. Finding no such
relationship, the court ruled that plaintiff had stated a valid claim
under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for violations of due
process, equal protection and taking of property without just
compensation.
The court's rationale effectively transforms every subdivision exac-
tion case into a potential claim under section 1983, which can be used
to obtain damages and attorney's fees for successful plaintiffs and can
be brought in either the state or federal courts. The availability of
damages and attorney's fees substantially increases the stakes for local
55. Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983).
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governments in exactions cases. Formerly, if local governments incor-
rectly predicted which exactions a court would approve, the penalty
was usually only the return to the developer of the property or money
exacted. Moreover, in states like California, which is within the juris-
diction of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the state courts have
been highly unreceptive to developers' complaints about the dramatic
increases in development fees and taxes that have been instituted fol-
lowing Proposition 13. Under the logic of the Parks opinion, these cases
can now be brought in the federal courts where the developer may find
a more sympathetic ear.56
The majority's analysis in Parks v. Watson57 is substantially iden-
tical under both the taking and equal protection clauses. In Parks a
taking was found because the well donation requirement "had no ra-
tional relationship to any public purpose related to the vacation of the
public streets," 58 and a violation of equal protection was found because
the well donation requirement "is totally unrelated to [the City's] stat-
utorily defined interest in determining whether to . . . [vacate the
streets] .,,5
Surpisingly perhaps, the court did not consider whether under the
Loretto test a "permanent physical occupation" of the well was being
demanded by the city.60 Ironically, the application of such a test might
have the effect of inhibiting some of the most traditional forms of exac-
tions, including the dedication of internal streets in a subdivision, while
leaving linkage programs untouched.61 Instead, the court applied the
taking clause indirectly, through the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine, by analogizing the case to one involving subdivision exactions.
The court discussed the older Illinois rule and, as its counterpart, a
56. See also Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 703 F.2d 1141 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, __ U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 151 (1983). In regard to potential
abstention by the Ninth Circuit in land use cases, compare Playtime Theaters, Inc. v.
City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527, 532-33 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 105
S. Ct. 2015 (1985), with Kollsman v. City of Los Angeles, 737 F.2d 830 (9th Cir.
1984).
57. 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983).
58. Id. at 655.
59. Id. The dissenting judge viewed the street vacation as a conveyance of public
property rather than the issuance of a permit, and would have upheld the city's actions
under the broad discretion given to a public body to negotiate the price of property it
sells. Id. at 665-69 (Wallace, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
61. See Costonis, Presumptions and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model For
the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 465, 494 and n.120 (1983).
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California case that requires only that the exaction have some relation-
ship to the needs created by the subdivision. The court summarized its
discussion by saying that "there is agreement among the states 'that
the dedication should have some reasonable relationship to the needs
created by the sub-division.' "62 The court cited as examples of interests
having at least some relationship to street vacation the "control of traf-
fic, pollution or access." 63
Whether the Parks opinion is part of an emerging trend toward
more serious analysis of the rational relationship of governmental regu-
lations to the purposes they purport to serve remains to be seen. Recent
Supreme Court decisions, such as Zobel v. Williams,64 in which the
court found no rational basis for an Alaska law apportioning surplus
mineral income among the state's residents on the basis of the length of
time they have lived in the state, and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center,5 in which the court found no rational basis for special
restrictions on homes for retarded people, can be analyzed as cases in
which the Court saw no adequate linkage between the government reg-
ulation and the public purpose to be served.66 Professor John Costonis
has also recently argued that the Supreme Court's taking clause deci-
sions pay special attention to the linkage between the purpose of the
regulation and the use of the affected property. 7 When such a linkage
is absent, he argues, the Court is more likely to find a regulation inva-
lid because it is "loading up on one individual more than his just share
of the burdens of government ... .
62. Parks, 716 F.2d at 653 (quoting Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217,
220 (Utah 1979)).
63. Parks, 716 F.2d at 651 n.l.
64. 457 U.S. 55 (1982). See also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S.
422, 442 (1982)(Blackmun, J., concurring). See also id. at 444 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
65. 53 U.S.L.W. 5022, 105 S. Ct. (1985).
66. See also Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 53 U.S.L.W. 4827 105 S. Ct.
- (1985); Williams v. Vermont, 53 U.S.L.W. 4659, 105 S. Ct. - (1985); Metro-
politan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 53 U.S.L.W. 4399, 105 S. Ct. - (1985).
67. Costonis, supra note 61, at 486-88. But see Tarlock, Regulatory Takings,
Cm. KENT L. REV. 23, 33 (1984). Professor John Humbach would find no taking
whenever linkage-related affirmative obligations were imposed on a developer.
Humbach, A Unifying Theory For the Just-Compensation Cases: Takings, Regulation
and Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 278-79 (1982).
68. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 313 (1893), quoted
in Costonis, supra note 61, at 486. Professor Costonis cites Prune Yard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) and Penn Central Transport Co. v. City of New
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Although neither of these trends can be described as well estab-
lished, they suggest that it is at least worthwhile to examine developer
exactions against a more rigorous standard of "reasonable relationship"
to determine whether certain types of exactions are more likely to be at
risk than others.
The conventional forms of developer exactions seem relatively safe
under this type of scrutiny, assuming that the cost to the developer does
not reach the degree of magnitude necessary to constitute a denial of
all beneficial use of the land - a test not easily found to be violated. 9
Even exactions for less traditional public services might well be upheld
if the services were in fact needed by the proposed development. If an
impact fee for geothermal heat distribution were imposed at the time of
development approval, and if the city were in fact proposing to supply
geothermal heat to the development, a court might well find a reasona-
ble relationship between the regulation and the exaction."0
In summary, more rigorous scrutiny of the rational relationship
test may make it difficult to justify exactions designed to resolve broad
public problems for which the specific development proposal of the par-
ticular developer bears no real blame in a cost accounting sense. And,
whether by coincidence or otherwise, this construction of the constitu-
tional standard seems to parallel a similar trend in the state courts to-
ward putting some real teeth in the rational nexus standard.
VI. State Law
In a field such as land use law, where the courts of different states
take widely varying positions, it is risky to generalize on the prospects
of a new regulatory technique. Nevertheless, there do seem to be some
common trends in the analysis of development exactions by the courts
of a number of prominent states. An examination of these trends may
yield some useful speculation on the way that state courts will deter-
York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) as the only recent "affirmations of this principle.
69. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 355 (1980); Goldblatt v. Town of Hemp-
stead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). But cf. Hamilton Bank of Johnson County v. Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n, 729 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53
U.S.L.W. 3235 (Oct. 1, 1984). If the court were to treat these exactions as permanent
physical occupations, however, the result might not be the same. See Loretto, 458 U.S.
at 419.
70. In Parks v. Watson, the city had granted the plaintiff's petition to rezone the
property to allow more residential use, apparently without imposing any exactions at
the time. 716 F.2d at 649.
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mine the validity of linkage programs. In addition, recent decisions
from Utah, Texas and Florida will be examined as precursors of a new
level of analysis may have a significant impact on the validity of the
various types of linkage programs.
Over the past twenty years the courts of virtually all of the states
have come to use the term "rational nexus" to describe the test used to
measure the validity of development exactions. The early court deci-
sions adopting the rational nexus formulation were viewed by most
commentators as a liberation of local governments from the strictures
of earlier rules.7 1 The scholars who first proposed the test saw it as a
"cost-accounting approach" that would make it "possible to determine
the costs generated by new residents and thus to avoid charging the
newcomers more than a proportionate share. '72 The succeeding years
witnessed a number of opinions, particularly in California, that applied
the rational nexus test to uphold exactions using the loosest possible
type of nexus.73 This led some commentators to treat the rational nexus
test much like the rational basis test for equal protection-as a test the
government always passes.7 4 At other times the court decisions incorpo-
rating the rational nexus test seemed to use it in such a widely varying
manner that the term seems to represent nothing more than a loosening
of the more restrictive standards used to evaluate the financing of local
improvements through special assessments. More recently, however,
courts have begun to put more meat on the rational nexus bones so that
it becomes the basis for fairly rigorous analysis, in the manner that its
original proponents intended, rather than a slogan used to justify any
currently popular municipal policy.
The more rigorous version of the rational nexus test, as currently
applied, requires a two-part analysis. First, it requires some real show-
ing that the particular development will create a "need" and that the
amount of the exaction bears some roughly proportional relationship to
71. See R. FREILICH & P. LEvI, MODEL SUPERVISION REGULATIONS: TEXT AND
COMMENTARY 124-28 (1975).
72. Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Costs on
New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1118, 1137
(1964).
73. See, e.g., Liberty v. Calif. Coastal Comm'n, 113 Cal. App. 3d 491, 170 Cal.
Rptr. 247 (1981); J.W. Jones Co. v. City of San Diego, 157 Cal. App. 745, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 580 (1984); Kalaydjian v. City of Los Angeles, 149 Cal. App. 3d 690, 197 Cal.
Rptr. 149 (1983).
74. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 44, at 1212-13; Williams, Planning Law In
the 1980's: What Do We Know About It?, 7 VERMONT L. REV. 205, 228 (1982).
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the share of the overall need that is contributed by this particular de-
velopment. 75 The second part of the test requires that the funds or
property exacted from the developer be earmarked to be used in a way
that provides some degree of "benefit" to the development from which
the exaction was received.76 When the exaction relates to traditional
public services and facilities usually provided to new residential devel-
opment, the courts have generally accepted the proposition that the
new development causes some need for new facilities such as streets,
sewers, water, parks, and schools." Where the exaction is for some
more exotic service or facility, such as the geothermal well involved in
Parks, the courts may conclude that no need exists and reject the valid-
ity of the exaction without going futher."8
If some need is found, however, the court proceeds to analyze the
relationship between the amount of the exaction and the share of the
overall need contributed by the particular development. Using this
analysis, recent court decisions have tended to scrutinize closely one
commonly-practiced type of development exaction: the demand that de-
velopers contribute right-of-way for major thoroughfares adjoining
their developments. Thus, where the government seeks to build or
widen a major highway through a developing area and the landowners
are asked to contribute the right-of-way as a condition to receiving de-
velopment approval, the courts are increasingly willing to measure the
share of total traffic to be carried by the highway that is to be contrib-
uted by the proposed development. If there is not some reasonable de-
gree of proportionality between the amount of land exacted for the
75. See, e.g., Billings Properties Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 30-
31, 394 P.2d 182, 187-88 (1964); Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay Inc.
v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971); Call
v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee
Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 602, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965).
76. Hayes v. City of Albany, 7 Or. App. 277, 280, 490 P.2d 1018, 1020 (1971);
City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984); Contrac-
tors and Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976); Call v. City of
West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 1979); Coulter v. City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d
888, 900 (Wyo. 1983). See Juergensmeyer & Blake, Impact Fees: An Answer To Lo-
cal Governments' Capital Funding Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 415, 432 (1981).
77. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d at 217; Billings Properties, Inc., 144 Mont. at
25, 394 P.2d at 182; City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d at 314.
78. For background on the planning implications of geothermal energy, and in
particular the resources of Klamath Falls, see Pasqualetti, The Site Specific Nature of
Geothermal Energy: The Primary Role of Land Use Planning in Nonelectric Develop-
ment, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 795, 802-03 (1983).
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highway and the share of the traffic demand contributed by the pro-
posed development the courts will invalidate the exaction.79 One court
recently adopted a rule-of-thumb that developers may be asked to con-
tribute land for highways transsecting their development but not for
highways on the fringes thereof, a test which would hardly withstand
rigorous economic analysis but may bear some common-sense relation-
ship to the type of distinction the court is seeking to draw.s0
Although the demand for proportionality has resulted in the invali-
dation of some exactions, the widespread use of the rational nexus test
as a means of evaluating all exactions has broadened the scope of facil-
ities and services for which exactions can be used. Instead of applying a
particular rule for streets and another rule for parks, courts have effec-
tively held that an exaction can be levied for any service or facility for
which a proportional share of need can be proven.8' This broadening of
the scope of exactions plays an important role in the development of
linkage programs.
As the second part of the rational nexus test, the courts have been
insisting that the local government demonstrate that the exacted funds
or property will actually be used for the benefit of the development. In
a recent case the Supreme Court of Arkansas declined to enforce an
exaction for parks because the local government had not demonstrated
that it had a plan to spend the funds. The Court, therefore, could not
ascertain whether the funds would be spent for the benefit of the devel-
opment.8 2 Similarly, a Florida court approved an exaction for parks
only after examining extensive evidence demonstrating that the funds
would be allocated in a manner that would provide a reasonably pro-
portional degree of benefit to all persons contributing to the fund.83
The test described above is a rough generalization which ignores
nuances of state law even in those states that seem to conform to the
rational nexus test-not to mention the peculiar legal rules that still
may be applicable elsewhere. It is worthwhile, therefore, to look indi-
vidually at a few states. Texas, Utah and Florida are each rapidly
79. Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v. Town of Plainfield, 117 N.H. 817, 821, 379
A.2d 200, 204 (1977).
80. Cupp v. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfax County, - Va. -, 318 S.E.2d 407,
414-15 (1984). See Howard County v. JJM Inc., - Md. _, 482 A.2d 908, 920-21
(1984).
81. Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 76, at 419.
82. City of Fayetteville v. IBI, Inc., 280 Ark. 484, 659 S.W.2d 505 (1983).
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growing Sun Belt states in which there have been a number of signifi-
cant development exaction decisions in the last three years.
An intermediate Texas court of appeals attracted national atten-
tion in 1980 when it held that "parks are not necessarily beneficial to a
community or neighborhood" and therefore struck down as invalid on
its face an ordinance imposing an exaction for parks.84 The case appar-
ently eventually attracted the attention of the Supreme Court of Texas
because, when in 1984 the court of appeals issued another similar opin-
ion, the Supreme Court of Texas granted a writ of error and reversed
the court of appeals.85
In its opinion the Texas Supreme Court upheld the general princi-
ple of development exactions and announced that it would use the ra-
tional nexus test in evaluating them. It remanded the case to the trial
court to allow the developer to present evidence that the exaction cre-
ated a disproportionate burden on its particular development. The court
set out guidelines for the trial court in making that determination, say-
ing that the developer must demonstrate that there is no reasonable
connection between the increased population arising from the develop-
ment and the increased park and recreational needs of the neighbor-
hood 86 In addition, the trial court was instructed to consider the bene-
fit to the subdivision from the exactions in order to constrain the reach
of the municipality and ensure that the subdivision receives relief from
a perceived need. The court noted that "unless the court considers the
benefit, a city could, with monetary exactions, place a park so far from
the particular subdivision that the residents receive no benefit, ' '87 citing
as examples of the type of evidence that the trial court may consider
"size of lots in the subdivision, the economic impact on the subdivi-
sion," and "the amount of open land consumed by the development."88
The Utah Supreme Court has recently gone even further in ana-
lyzing the factors that should be considered in evaluating the validity of
a development exaction. In Banberry Development Corp. v. South Jor-
dan City, 9 the court stated that the total depreciated value of the ex-
isting capital system for providing the particular service or facility
84. Berg Dev. Co. v. City of Missouri City, 603 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App.
1980).
85. City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984),
rev'g 666 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. Ct. App.).
86. City of College Station, 680 S.W.2d at 806-07.
87. Id. at 807.
88. Id.
89. 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981).
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should be the starting point in determining the validity of any exaction,
whether for a centralized facility like a sewage treatment plant or for
dispersed facilities like parksY0 The exaction must bear some relation-
ship to the size of the new development as a proportion of all develop-
ments served by the facilities, except that "extraordinary costs in serv-
ing the new development" may also be considered.9' In a subsequent
opinion the court emphasized that the methods of financing the existing
capital facilities needed to be examined to ensure that new development
would be credited with any other contributions that they would be
making to the cost of the services or facilities, such as through tax
revenue user charges or other payments collected from the entire mu-
nicipality (including the new development).9 0
The Florida courts have also recently decided a series of important
cases relating to development exactions. The Florida courts have
adopted a rational nexus standard akin to that used now in the major-
ity of states and have made it clear that they will examine the evidence
in some detail to determine whether an appropriate nexus exists. A
1976 Florida Supreme Court decision involving a fee for a proportional
share of the capital expansion costs of a sewage treatment plan, Con-
tractors and Builders Association of Pinellas County v. City of Dune-
din,93 and a subsequent district court decision on remand,94 set forth
the tests that have subsequently been applied to uphold the validity of
impact fees of Florida.95
In Dunedin, the city ordinance imposing an impact fee of $325 per
dwelling unit for water facilities and $375 per dwelling unit for sewer
facilities was challenged as an ultra vires attempt by the city to tax. In
upholding the concept of impact fees, the Florida Supreme Court made
clear that local government may require a new user of public facilities
to pay a fair share of the costs imposed by new use of the system. More
specifically, the Supreme Court established three standards for a valid
impact fee ordinance:
1. New development must require that the present system of pub-
90. Id.
91. Id. at 904.
92. Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d 376, 379 (Utah 1982); Banberry Dev.
Corp., 642 P.2d at 904.
93. 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976).
94. Contractors and Builders Ass'n of Pinellas County v. City of Dunedin, 358
So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
95. See generally J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, FLORIDA LAND USE RE-
STRICTIONS ch. 17 (1984).
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lic facilities be expanded;
2. The fees imposed on users must be no more than what the local
government unit would incur in accommodating the new users of the
system; and
3. The fees must be expressly earmarked for the purposes for
which they were charged.96
The Supreme Court rejected older Florida cases, which had used a
standard more appropriate to special assessments, by authorizing an
impact fee for a proportionate share of public facilities that benefitted
the public generally. Three district court of appeal opinions handed
down in 1983 extended the permissible uses of local government impact
fees and more clearly established the tests under which local impact
fees in Florida will be held valid.
Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County97 involved a fee required to be
paid to the county as a condition of plat approval, to be used for the
capital costs of expanding the county-wide park system. Under the
challenged ordinance, a subdivider has the option (with the agreement
of the county) of dedicating land, a fee-in-lieu of land which otherwise
would be dedicated, or a fee determined by a schedule based on the
number and size of dwelling units to be built.
Under the standards established by Dunedin, the court found the
ordinance to be a valid exercise of the police power. Impact fees or
dedication requirements are permissible, the court found, if they show
a "reasonable connection" or "rational nexus" in two ways: (1) the fees
offset needs sufficiently attributable to the growth in population gener-
ated by the subdivision, and (2) the funds collected are sufficiently
earmarked for the substantial benefit of the subdivision residents. By
adhering to these two tests, "local governments can shift to new resi-
dents the reasonable capital costs incurred on their account." '98
Town of Longboat Key v. Lands End, Ltd.99 involved an ordinance
requiring developers to deed land or pay a fee before final approval of
development plans for the purpose of acquiring open space and park
land. The Second District Court of, Appeal remanded the case to the
trial court to apply the tests established in Hollywood, Inc. The court
specifically stated that the fees must be shown to offset, but not exceed,
96. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d at 317-18 (1976).
97. 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 440 So.
2d 352 (Fla. 1983).
98. Id. at 611.
99. 433 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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reasonable needs attributable to the new subdivision residents, and
must be adequately earmarked for capital assets that will sufficiently
benefit the new residents.100
Home Builders and Contractors Ass'n. of Palm Beach County v.
Board of Palm Beach County Commissioners10' was decided seven
months after Hollywood, Inc. In this case the Fourth District upheld
an impact fee for road improvements. The Palm Beach ordinance re-
quired new land development activity generating road traffic (including
residential, commercial and industrial uses) to pay a fair share of the
cost of expanding new roads attributable to the new development. The
developer could pay according to a formula based on the costs of road
construction and the number of motor vehicle trips generated by differ-
ent types of land use. Alternatively, a developer could submit his own
study of his fair share of the road costs. Funds collected were placed in
a trust fund for expenditure in one of forty zones established through-
out the county in which the development is located.
The court found that the draftsmen of the Palm Beach County
ordinance had "Dunedin's lessons in mind." The court adopted the
principles set forth in the leading article by Juergensmeyer and Blake,
and stated that it saw no reason why the same principles should not
apply to roads. 0 2 The court held that the improvements paid for by the
ordinance need not be used exclusively or overwhelmingly for those
who pay so long as they bear a reasonable relationship to the needs
created by the subdivision. The Palm Beach County expenditure zone
system met this test. 0 3
The validity of the fees, as recognized by Florida cases, is judged
by methods of assessment and expenditure. The local government must
demonstrate that the need for the fee is created by new growth (and
the fee does not exceed the cost of the new growth) and that the funds
collected are earmarked for the benefit of the new residents who pay.
At the same time, the courts have accepted the use of a generalized
methodology to meet these tests. For example, the Palm Beach County
100. Id. at 576 (case settled prior to a new trial).
101. 446 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
102. Id. at 145 (quoting Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 76, at 440-41). The
Florida Supreme Court had earlier held that both sewage treatment and county roads
had countywide benefit for the purpose of interpreting a state constitutional provision
allowing counties to use property taxes from incorporated areas only for services and
facilities of countywide benefit. See City of St. Petersburg v. Briley, Wild & Assoc.,
239 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1970); Burke v. Charlotte County, 286 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1973).
103. Home Builders, 446 So.2d at 145.
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zone system was sufficient, as was the Broward County proof of park
usage patterns, to show that new residents would be sufficiently benefit-
ted by the fees.
The Florida legislature has reinforced these court decisions with
new legislation encouraging local governments to use development ex-
actions to meet local facility needs. Local governments that seek to at-
tract major developments will be required to exact from each new de-
velopment its proportionate share of all facilities needed "to
accomodate any impacts having a rational nexus" to the develop-
ment.10 4 Failure to impose such requirements on all developers will pre-
vent local governments from approving developments of regional im-
pact unless either the developer or the local government remedy all
impacts themselves0" - a condition unlikely to be feasible if major
facilities are involved.
Texas, Utah and Florida have grown more rapidly between 1980
and 1983 than any other state having a population over one million.106
Each of these states has recognized that development exactions can be
a valid and effective means of coping with that growth, but that judi-
cial supervision is needed to ensure that exactions remain within rea-
sonable limits. The courts of these states have followed the modern
trend of limiting exactions not by any arbitrary rules regarding the na-
ture of the facilities or the type of development, but by requiring a
showing that the exaction is proportionate to the share of need for new
facilities created by the new development.
VII. The Nexus of Linkage
How will linkage programs fare under the more rigorous analysis
required by the evolving test of rational nexus? Those local govern-
ments that merely see the development industry as a deep pocket for
general government program are likely to be disappointed. But local
governments which carefully analyze the development process and limit
their demands to those that can be justified by that analysis should be
able to expand exactions beyond their traditional usage for streets, sew-
ers and parks to include housing-related programs. In determining
whether the rationale of the exactions cases will support linkage pro-
104. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(15)(e)(1) (1985).
105. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(15)(e)(2) (1985).
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grams, it is first necessary to determine whether housing is for some
reason an inappropriate public program for which an exaction may be
levied. If not, the linkage programs need to be tested against the tradi-
tional nexus methodology.
Modern courts have suggested few limitations on the range of pub-
lic facilities and services for which exactions may be used. The separate
line of cases regarding parks, street and utilities have now fused into a
single theory applied to all public services and facilities. 10 7 Although
some types of public service, such as police and fire protection, are
much less capital-intensive than streets and parks, and thus tend to
generate only modest exactions, the capital component of even such
"diffuse" services can be analyzed under the rational nexus test.108 In
any event, housing is as capital-intensive as the programs for which
exactions have traditionally been used. Therefore, the underlying ra-
tional nexus theory itself poses no limitations on the range of public
facilities and services to which it can be applied.
Even though the methodology can be applied, it can be argued
that public policy or specific constitutional guarantees should limit the
use of exactions for certain types of facilities. For example, some ser-
vices such as police and fire protection are so basic or essential to pub-
lic safety that too precise an apportionment of their cost might detract
from a uniform commitment to protection.10 9 Other services such as
public education have traditionally been "free" to the users and state
constitutional guarantees of free education may affect the validity of
any fee or user charge for education.110 It is clear, however, that there
is no similar right to housing under the federal constitution 1 or under
the constitutions of states other than New Jersey.1 2 Thus a constitu-
107. Exactions cases originated in separate lines involving subdivision exactions
and utility charges, but modern courts now regularly apply the same principles to both
areas. See, e.g., Billings Properties, Inc., 144 Mont. at 30-31, 394 P.2d at 187-88;
Lafferty, 642 P.2d at 379; Town of Longboat Key, 433 So. 2d at 574.
108. In dicta the California Supreme Court has questioned whether exactions
should be used to finance "the more general or diffuse need created for such areawide
services as fire and police protection." Associated Homebuilders of Greater East Bay,
Inc., 4 Cal. 3d at 633, 484 P.2d at 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
109. See Emerson College v. City of Boston, __ Mass. , 462 N.E. 2d 1098,
1106 (1984).
110. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 ("Adequate provision shall be made by
law for a uniform system of free public schools. .. ").
111. J. NOVAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 825-26
(1983).
112. The New Jersey Constitution has been interpreted to require local govern-
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tional claim based on a right to have new housing constructed seems to
have little chance of success.
Could it be argued that public policy requires that low-income
housing be constructed with funds derived from general revenue
sources? Public construction of housing for the poor is so recent a phe-
nomenon that no such tradition exists. Some commentators suggest, in
fact, that it is bad policy for the government to construct subsidized
housing at all, arguing that such subsidies reduce the mobility that
lower income families need in order to follow job opportunities. 31 The
federal government is currently instituting a housing voucher program
based on this rationale." 4 But state and local governments, with federal
support, continue to subsidize housing through such programs as mort-
gage revenue bonds, which increasingly benefit the middle range of the
market as well as the lower range.1 5 Even the strongest opponents of
the policy behind such housing programs would be unlikely to claim
that they exceed government powers." 6 Given the wide range of
sources from which housing is subsidized there seems to be no policy
reason why exactions could not be used as another source.
On balance, although one may question the wisdom of subsidizing
housing construction through linkage programs, the fact that the out-
put is housing does not present any compelling legal reason why the
tests used to evaluate other development exactions may not be applied
to such programs.
ments to undertake "affirmative measures" to meet lower income housing needs. South-
ern Burlington County NAACP v. Twp of Mt. Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390, 442
(1983). No other state seems to impose such a requirement. Although the California
Supreme Court has expressed concern about the effect of land use controls on regional
housing needs, Associated Home Builders of Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of
Livermore, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976), and the legislature
of that state has mandated planning to meet housing needs. CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT
CODE §§ 65580 if. (1983), the local governments of that state are under no real pres-
sure to undertake affirmative measures to provide housing. See Building Industry Ass'n
of Southern California v. City of Camarillo, 213 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1985). See also the
New York judicial rhetoric most recently expressed in Blitz v. Town of New Castle,
463 N.Y.S. 2d 832 (1983).
113. See generally R. STRUYK & M. BENDICK, HOUSING VOUCHERS FOR THE
POOR: LESSONS FROM A NATIONAL EXPERIMENT (1981).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 f(o) (1984).
115. Peterson & Muller, Housing Cost Reduction Through The Tax Exempt
Market in HOUSING SUPPLY & AFFORDABILITY 249, 251-53 (Urban Land Inst. 1983).
116. Ellickson, Inclusionary Housing Programs: Another Misguided Urban Pol-
icy (unpublished paper for CUNY Symposium, Nov. 14, 1983).
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The extent to which exactions may be imposed for housing-related
linkage programs should depend on the local government's ability to
show (1) that there is a need for housing, (2) that the need is caused by
new development, (3) that the exaction is proportional to the need
caused, (4) that the exaction will be used to remedy the need, and (5)
that the remedy will benefit the occupants of the new development.
Both Boston and San Francisco experience a high demand for
housing, and few would argue that these cities meet any objective test
for housing need.11 7 Other cities, however, may have a difficult time
meeting such a test, particularly if they are experiencing a net outflow
of population." 8
Assuming that a need for housing exists, what is its cause? Proof
of causation in the development process is no simple matter and can be
the source of endless debate. The key issue is the determination of what
causes a need for new housing. San Francisco and Boston both believe
that the need for housing is stimulated by the new employment that
results from the construction of new office buildings. 119 This argument
has been challenged at both tiers of its logic. Does the construction of
office buildings create jobs? Do jobs create a need for housing?
San Francisco economist Claude Gruen argues that "additions to
the supply of office space don't make office employment any more than
cribs made babies.' 120 Any private developer of speculative facilities,
117. See Griffin, Jr., Inclusionary Housing and Linkage in Boston and Cam-
bridge, Mass. 12 (unpublished paper presented at Urban Land Institute conference on
"Downtown Linkage," New York City, April 11, 1985); Gruen, A Case History of the
San Francisco Office-Housing Linkage Program 2-4 (unpublished paper presented at
Urban Land Institute conference on "Downtown Linkage," New York City, April 11,
1985).
118. The Chicago planning department, in exploring the advantages and disad-
vantages of an exactions program, reported that between 1970 and 1980 the City of
Chicago lost roughly 6,100 dwelling units per year to fire and demolition and gained
5034 units per year of new construction, for a net loss of 1066 units per year, while
population declined at the rate of about 36,500 people per year. CITY OF CHICAGO
DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING, STAFF REPORT ON EXACTIONS 13-14 (June, 1985).
119. See Agnost, Conditioning Approval of Commercial Development on the
Construction of Affordable Housing - The San Francisco Experiment (unpublished
paper for the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers Conference, October 30,
1984).
120. Gruen, The Economics of Requiring Office Space Development to Contrib-
ute to the Productgion and/or Rehabilitation of Housing, 8 (unpublished paper
presented at Urban Land Institute conference on "Downtown Linkage," New York
City, April 11, 1985).
1985]
27
Bosselman and Stroud: Mandatory Tithes: The Legality of Land Development Linkage
Published by NSUWorks, 1985
Nova Law Journal
whether office or retail or housing, can argue that the facilities them-
selves do not create the demand - they are only responding to a de-
mand caused by overall economic conditions. The argument is reminis-
cent of the slogan "guns don't kill people, people kill people," which
suggests that an instrumentality is being forced unfairly to bear the
blame that should be attached to the operator. The equivalent of the
trigger-puller is the in-migrant. Is it the in-migrant who causes the im-
pact? If so, should he or she bear the burden directly?
In a chain of causation it is always possible to argue that the pre-
ceding link should bear responsibility. An argument that development
does not cause economic impact, however, would also undermine the
public purpose behind such programs for subsidizing development as
industrial revenue bonds and tax increment financing. Whatever philo-
sophical merits this argument may or may not have, it has garnered
little judicial support."' The Supreme Court has exhibited increasing
concern about discrimination against out-of-state residents, but has
thus far restricted its concern to regulations having a direct rather than
an indirect impact on outsiders.122 Should the court begin to examine
the indirect effect of development financing methods on interstate mi-
gration it will be necessary to re-examine not only linkage programs
but other well accepted types of user charges and development
exactions.123
If the argument that development creates new jobs is accepted,
one reaches the issue of whether the new jobs create a need for new
housing. The answer is not as simple as it appears. Jobs come and go in
a never-ending stream as businesses open and close, expand and con-
tract. The peculiar value of cities may stem from the very flexibility
with which their job market can respond to constant change.1 24 In such
an environment, the addition of any new job does not necessarily mean
that the net number of jobs is increased because the job may have been
transferred from another location in the community. If the business is
moving to promote efficiency in operation, on balance more jobs may
have been lost than gained, which would suggest that future out-migra-
121. See, e.g., Loup-Miller Constr. Co. v. City and County of Denver, 676 P.2d
1170, 1173-75 (Colo. 1984); J. W. Jones Co. v. City of San Diego, 203 Cal. Rptr. at
588; Home Builders, 446 So. 2d at 144. See generally J. NOWACK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
N. YOUNG, supra note 11, at 812-16.
122. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
123. See Juergensmeyer & Gregg, Limiting Population Growth in Florida and
the Nation: The Constitutional Issues, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 758, 778-83 (1974).
124. JACOBS, THE ECONOMY OF CITIES 91-100 (1969).
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tion might cause a decline in housing demand.
Even if the total number of jobs does increase, the demand for
housing does not necessarily increase along with it. A city's population
is constantly changing through in-migration and out-migration, birth
and death. Recent years have seen dramatic decreases in average
household size, which has to some extent been accompanied by the
splitting up of larger dwelling units. 125 The existing housing stock is
constantly changing as people build additions or convert housing to
non-residential use or vice versa. New housing units are built while
others are demolished. Few large cities have trustworthy statistical
measures that keep tract of such small-scale changes in the housing
supply as conversions and abandonments.
The complexity of the housing market does not mean that a rela-
tionship between jobs and housing cannot be shown, but it does mean
that a fairly sophisticated analysis will be needed to meet the emerging
tests in states like Utah, Texas and Florida. Whether the office-housing
linkage in cities like San Francisco or Boston would be able to pass the
causation element of a modern rational nexus test will depend on
whether the documentation by the planning department of the relation-
ship between office development and the need for housing can survive
the scrutiny of litigation.
The causal connection needed to justify inclusionary zoning pro-
grams - that new housing creates a need for new low income housing
- is even less clear. Its proponents argue that if developers can be
required to provide streets, sewers and other facilities needed to service
their development they should also be required to provide housing for
the workers who would be needed to operate these facilities and ser-
vices? If a state accepts even the loosest causal connection as a basis
for development exactions this argument may be satisfactory,126 so it is
125. For example, the average household size in Chicago went from 2.91 people
in 1970 to 2.70 people in 1980 and is projected to go to 2.15 people in 1990. CITY OF
CHICAGO DEPT. OF PLANNING, supra note 118, at 13.
126. Fox & Davis, Density Bonus Zoning to Provide Low and Moderate Cost
Housing, 3 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 1015, 1033 (1976); Kleven, supra note 36, at 1497-
98; Hill, Governmental Manipulation of Land Values to Build Affordable Housing:
The Issue of Compensating Benefits, 13 REAL ESTATE L.J. 3, 25-26 (1984). But see
King, Inclusionary Zoning: Unfair Response To the Need for Low Cost Housing 4 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 597, 615-28 (1982); Ellickson, The Irony of Inclusionary Zoning,
54 So. CAL. L. REV. 1167 (1981); A. MALLACH, supra note 36, at 36-37; Costonis,
supra note 61, at 489-90. The fact that a "bonus" is offered in connection with the
exaction may be of some value in supporting its validity. See Willams, Jr., On the
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not surprising to find that California is the site of many inclusionary
zoning programs . 21 Other states might find it harder to accept the ar-
gument that new housing causes a need for jobs for lower income
people.12 8
If a causal relation between the development and the need for
housing is established, the next step is to measure the proportional
share of the need attributed to the particular development. Would the
linkage programs in Boston and San Francisco meet a test of propor-
tionality? Neither program explicitly credits the new development with
any of the property tax or other revenue it will generate toward poten-
tial housing programs. On the other hand, the city may be able to ar-
gue that the exaction is so small in relation to the need that even with
Inclination of Developers to Help the Poor: Designing Affirmative Measures to Induce
the Construction of Lower Income Housing after Mt. Laurel II 17-19 (unpublished
paper for Nov. 14, 1983, CUNY Graduate School Symposium); Kleven, Inclusionary
Zoning and the Nexus Issue 8-9 (unpublished paper, CUNY Graduate School Sympo-
sium, Nov. 14, 1983).
127. See S. SCHWARTZ & R. JOHNSTON, LOCAL GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES FOR
AFFORDABLE HOUSING: AN EVALUATION OF INCLUSIONARY HOUSING PROGRAMS IN
CALIFORNIA (Inst. of Governmental Affairs, Univ. of California at Davis, Environmen-
tal Quality Services No. 35, December, 1981). The inclusionary program in Orange
County, California, has been frequently cited as an effective one. See Burton, Califor-
nia Legislature Prohibits Exclusionary Zoning, Mandates Fair Share, SAN FERN.
VALLEY L. REV. 19, 34-37 (1981); Bozung, A Positive Response to Growth Control
Plans: The Orange County Inclusionary Housing Program, 9 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 819
(1982). In 1983, however, the county board voted to phase out the program. See R.
ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 8, at 141 (Supp. 1984), A. MALLACH, supra
note 36, at 251.
128. See Costonis, supra note 61, at 489-91; Ellickson, supra note 44, at 1212;
Tegeler, supra note 45, at 694. Some states, however, have justified inclusionary pro-
grams not as an exaction but as an attempt to control the price of housing through
establishment of zoning criteria. Under this theory, the requirement that a certain
share of the housing be for low and moderate income people is merely a "criterion" of
the zoning, just like a requirement that the housing be set back fifty feet from the
street or less than fifty feet high. As the late Donald Hagman put it, if you could
downzone a place so that birds could sing why couldn't you downzone it so that poor
people could sing? Hagman, supra note 30, at 175. See Kleven, supra note 36, at 1502-
06. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, relying on such a theory, explicitly upheld
inclusionary zoning and encouraged its use by New Jersey municipalities. In the matter
of Egg Harbor Associates, 94 N.J. 358, 365, 464 A.2d 1115, 1123 (1983); Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel Two, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983).
See A. MALLACH, supra note 36, at 30-32, 226-33. For a discussion of the effect of the
Mt. Laurel case on exactions in New Jersey see Rose, New Additions to the Lexicon of
Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 851, 874-76 (1984).
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such credits the fee is not disproportionately high.
Finally, the earmarking test must be met. Whether the housing to
be built by the San Francisco and Boston programs will mitigate the
need for low-income housing, and do so in a way that benefits the de-
velopments that make the contributions, remains to be seen. In those
states that demand strict assurance in advance on these issues, the pro-
grams of both cities may be excessively loose. A more cautiously
designed linkage program would earmark the funds collected in a man-
ner that guarantees that the funds are used to meet the identified need,
and are used in accordance with an overall plan that ensures that the
funds will be spent in a manner that benefits the developments from
which they are collected. It should not be necessary to identify the spe-
cific capital project to which each dollar will be devoted, and the law-
yer's desire for precise evidence of linkage will undoubtedly need to be
balanced against the administrator's need for flexibility in the use of
funds and the administrative costs associated with the required analy-
sis. These costs can probably be reduced to the extent that the factors
identified can be converted into data that can be automatically
processed.
VIII. Conclusion
In summary, linkage programs should be required to meet the
same tests that have evolved for measuring the validity of other forms
of development exaction. Under those tests a housing program would
probably be a legally acceptable candidate for an exaction process. The
important factual question that remains to be evaluated is whether an
appropriate method can be established to relate housing need to other
types of development, and for assuring that housing will be built in a
way that provides a reciprocal benefit to that development. Like other
factual questions arising from a judicially-created standard, the answer
can only be found through additional litigation.
Beyond these legal issues, however, important policy questions re-
main. Charitable giving, whether through the ancient tithe or more
modern institutions, has been enforced through social pressures rather
than legal constraints. Many of the same business institutions that have
been relied on to provide support for housing programs through chari-
table gifts are now being required to support such programs through
mandatory linkage programs. If the idea of a mandatory tithe becomes
commonplace, it will remain to be seen whether our existing network of
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charitable programs can co-exist effectively with a compulsory system
having similar goals.
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